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Briefly Noted

Tass Summaries Untrustworthy: In the interests of filing an early story, many Moscow correspondents cable reports to their newspapers or press services based on Tass summaries. It has been noted that Tass reports of Khrushchev speeches, especially when intended for European consumption, suppress or play down belligerent passages, and stress offers to negotiate. In this way, most of the western press, including the US press, got a somewhat mistaken impression of Khrushchev's 7 August address; this naturally made it difficult for public opinion to understand why western governments have not been more speedy in taking up negotiations. We note that Tass's broadcast of Khrushchev's 11 August speech on Soviet-Rumanian friendship omitted statements that the Acropolis would not be safe from nuclear attack, and that the British lion had lost its power to frighten. Some of these omitted accounts are included in the Washington Post's 12 August story (see Press Comment, 15 August 1961). The columns of Joseph Alsop, frequently reprinted in Press Comment, have called attention to many of Khrushchev's aggressive statements, either to ambassadors or in the actual text of his speeches.

Reds Make Grain Deal Power Play: Despite severe food shortages within China itself, which reliable reports indicate are causing grave unrest, Red China was reported today to be shipping 2.2 million bushels of wheat purchased from Canada to Albania to help break an economic blockade against that country imposed by the USSR. (Washington Post, 10 August 1961, p. A19)

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4 August 1961

415. Castro's Currency Confiscation

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Background: The Castro government suddenly announced on 5 August 1961 that all Cuban currency would be withdrawn from circulation and new money issued, providing only a two-day period, 6 and 7 August, during which the exchange of old for new money would take place. Each family would be allowed to receive 200 new pesos for 200 old, however, each family would be compelled to turn in all money in its possession. The amount above 200 pesos would be put into special accounts from which nothing could be withdrawn for a period of one week. According to the official announcement, this procedure would enable the change-over to function more smoothly, and, at the end of the week, the blocked funds could be freely withdrawn.

The reasons given by the Castro regime for this drastic action are the need to remove the inflationary pressure of "hundreds of millions of pesos" held abroad, the fact that it would be dangerous to have Cuban currency continue to be printed abroad (Cuban currency is printed by The American Bank Note Company and the British firm of Thomas LaRue and Company, which together print the currency of nearly all the small nations of the world), and to strike a blow at Cuban exiles. As a Havana editorial puts it: "if the counter-revolutionaries want to continue their intrigues, they will have to use dollars to finance them."

There is little doubt that a mounting inflationary pressure exists in Cuba. However, it results more from the economic policies of the Castro government and the failure of the economy to produce under state management than from "outside pressure." Castro has been printing bank notes in large quantities to enable him to meet his promises of wage increases, which cannot be based on any other foundation because of the general decline in production and the tying of Cuba's trade to the Communist Bloc. At the same time that paper wage increases have risen by 500,000,000 pesos in the last two years, shortages of goods have increased steadily. Not only have luxury items, such as American soaps, appliances, etc., disappeared, but essential foods have become increasingly scarce. People now stand in long lines to obtain meat, cooking fats and even rice.

Whatever the ostensible reasons given for the move, this most fundamental of economic controls has been a standard procedure in Communist countries. The Soviets took this step at the outset of their regime, and have repeated the process at regular intervals. The European satellites have followed the same pattern, and currently Bulgaria is reported to be about to do so again. Of course, non-Communist governments faced with severe inflation, have occasionally been forced to re-issue currency. The Communist pattern, however, has been systematically used to force people to submit to arbitrary state controlled prices, rationing of goods and forced savings, with the added touch of the denunciation of those revealed as having large amounts of currency as "enemies of the revolution." It is clear that this step by Castro, although it may proceed circumspectly at first and actually permit withdrawals after one week as promised in the 5 August announcement, marks the beginning of a Communist-style policy of confiscation and total economic control.

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1 August 1961

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Background: General Medaris suggested at the time of Gagarin's flight that the Soviets had developed large-scale rockets because they had not been able to develop small-scale nuclear bombs. Be this as it may, Moscow has known how to make the most of its rocket program. Soviet rockets, in their twin guise as scientific achievements and weapons vehicles, are the backbone of Khrushchev's foreign policy. They constitute the main, almost the only real basis for claiming that the balance of world power has shifted in favor of the USSR--that in Marxist terms, there has been a "qualitative change." Actually Soviet frontiers stand where Stalin left them, the solidarity of the bloc has if anything decreased, agricultural problems persist, and Soviet industry gains only slowly and in selected areas on that of the free world. After a war in Korea and crises in Southeast Asia, the Near East, Africa, and elsewhere, the post-Stalin bloc has managed to pick up two new satellites (North Vietnam and Cuba) while losing another (Guatemala) and pulling back from Austria. Even in the space field, the US has orbited 45 earth satellites (28 still up) to the Soviet 13 (4 still up), and has published far more scientific data. But Khrushchev has unquestionably some big rockets, and he is vitally interested in exaggerating their importance.

To this end, the Kremlin has made an all-out attempt to exploit the Soviet space flights for propaganda. Films purporting to show the Gagarin flight have been shown around the world, although their content has provided very little information about what actually happened. Gagarin (in contrast to Alan B. Shepard) has apparently given up all astronautical activities to devote full time to touring and to repeating -- in the most vague and impressionistic terms -- the story of his flight. After travelling around the bloc and visiting Finland, the first astronaut went on to London. His visit there, along with a Soviet trade exposition and performances of the Leningrad Ballet, coincided with Khrushchev's menacing attitude on Berlin, and apparently represented part of a carrot and stick effort to pry Britain away from its NATO allies. Following this he went to Latin America, attending the 26 July celebrations in Havana where he pledged "the armed help of the Soviet people" in Cuba's "fight for freedom and independence." But in spite of this departure into politics, Gagarin was unprepared on 31 July for an ironic welcoming speech by the Governor of Rio de Janeiro who referred to Berlin, the Soviet suppression of freedom, and the threat of a new world war; Gagarin made no effective reply, and several appointments later that day were cancelled because he "needed rest." He went on to see Cyrus Eaton at Pugwash, Nova Scotia and from there he hurried back to the USSR to greet Major Gherman Titov. Henceforth there presumably will be two ambassadors of good will. Prior to Titov's flight, Gagarin was reported to have received invitations to come to Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Japan.

Nikita Khrushchev has not permitted the astronauts to take all the spotlight. He has assumed the role of a second father to these young men, exchanging Communist catchwords, and boasts with them, and he has taken for himself a lion's share of the credit, including an Order of Lenin for "the direction of the creation and development of rocket industry, science and technology and the realization of the world's first cosmic flight." To give him his due, Khrushchev very likely did provide the driving impetus behind the rocket program, recognizing its

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political value and propaganda potential. The whole propaganda orchestration, with its combination of menace and self-congratulation, its claim of scientific prowess and its concealment of scientific detail, bears the unmistakable Khrushchevian stamp. It is interesting to note that, despite the unquestionable proficiency of the USSR in the field of rocketry, fear of a failure still keeps them from announcing a shot until the successful completion of the most ticklish stage, the launching.

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Background: The long existing discord in the upper ranks of the Japanese Communist Party, which prevented the adoption of the party program at the 7th Congress in 1958, broke into open factionalism during preparations for the 8th Congress (25-31 July 1961) when Sojiro KASUGA, Chairman of the Control and Revision (Auditing) Commission, publicly criticized the dictatorial methods used by Secretary General Kenji MIYAMOTO and his supporters (the "mainstream" elements) to suppress intra-party discussion of policies, and submitted his resignation from the JCP.

On 8 July 1961, KASUGA issued the following statement at a press conference in Tokyo: "I have seceded from the Japanese Communist Party for which I have worked for nearly 40 years. However, I will remain a Communist and will make efforts to reform the Communist Party." Since KASUGA's resignation, the widespread dissatisfaction with the JCP leadership has come into the open. On 15 July, following KASUGA's announcement that he was leaving the Party, Rokuzaemon YAMADA, Kozo KAMEYAMA, Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA and Chishu NAITO, as well as candidate members Soji UCHINO and Zengo HARA, fearing that they would be prevented from expressing their views at the Party Congress, circulated an appeal calling for intra-Party democracy to break the bureaucratic control of the mainstream element, asking for rediscussion of the draft Party Platform without restriction from the mainstream, and the reelection of Congress delegates in accordance with Party Regulations. The Party's answer to this appeal was expulsion of the six, together with KASUGA at the Central Committee Plenum 20-22 July and condemnation of the secessionists as bogus Marxists and Leninists: "It is a matter for profound regret that under the increasingly serious international situation, at a time when the whole party is desperately trying to make the Congress a success, we see subversive elements engaging in new provocations.... At this grave moment Shojiro KASUGA and his group openly started to destroy the party from within. They have now joined the anti-Communist force and are ready to serve the American and Japanese reactionaries."

Actually, during his long Party career, KASUGA, who spent a total of 15 years in prison before and during World War II for his Party activities, had held such posts as Central Committee member and chairman of the Mass Movements Department, and was chosen to head the Control Commission at the Seventh Party Congress in July-August 1958. His break with the Party, announced by him at a press conference on 8 July, was the first such defection of a major Party leader since the May 1957 expulsion of Central Committee member Shigeo SHIDA, who left the Party to try to form a National Communist Party. Three of the four expelled Central Committee members, Rokuzaemon YAMADA, Kozo KAMEYAMA, and Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA had each served the Party for thirty years, candidate member Soji UCHINO for over twenty-five years, and Central Committee member Chishu NAITO and candidate member Zengo HARA fifteen years each. On 17 July, the Chairman of the Japanese Socialist Party invited the dissident Communists to join the JSP in an effort to encourage additional defections. On 23 July six former members of the Party's Tokyo Metropolitan Committee, Yasaburo NODA, Masami YAMAMOTO, Noboru NISHIO, Kakunosuke MASUDA, Hiroshi

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SHIBA, and Akio TAKEI, issued a statement entitled, "A Protest Against the Subversion of Intra-Party Democracy by Factional Bureaucrats." As in the case of the national officials, the Party's response to this appeal for more democracy within the Party was, of course, expulsion by the Tokyo Metropolitan Committee on 24 July. Apparently badly shaken by these blows to Party prestige and unity, and worried lest it would not be able to control the Party Congress, the mainstream also announced on 24 July the expulsion of intellectuals Noboru SATO, Shuji OHASHI, and Ryo MAENO for what the Party called "anti-Party propaganda activities in non-Communist publications." Growing unrest among Party intellectuals has long plagued Party leadership, which has made constant efforts to restrict the freedom of discussion by such individuals not wholly in accord with mainstream policies. Apparently still not sure how deep the roots of opposition were, the Party also announced that Haruo SAKURAI and Koichi YUGAMI, until recently officials of the Party's Self-Governing Bodies Department and Farmers Department respectively, were under investigation for suspected violation of Party Regulations.

At a meeting of 107 members of the anti-mainstream faction of the JCP in Osaka on 30 July, KASUGA emphasized that he has no intention of forming a second Communist Party, since there cannot be two Communist Parties. A few JCP leaders have made the JCP their personal property and killed intraparty democracy. The anti-leadership group is starting a new movement to promote the proper development of the JCP. This movement is based on Marxism-Leninism and will gather all those, including non-JCP members, who oppose the present bureaucratic JCP methods. Its basic principles are opposition to capitalism and structural reform.

At the same meeting Makoto OMORI, suspended former member of the JCP Osaka prefectoral committee, reported on preparations to establish a Kansai Regional Committee of a Socialist Workers Association. This organization and its name are provisional pending a nationwide conference of about 300 anti-mainstream delegates in Tokyo about 15-20 August.

The meeting elected 13 of the 17 members of this Kansai Regional Committee, including Rokuzaemon YAMADA and Zengo HARA. This committee has acquired a headquarters, as have two district committees already established in Osaka. Hikoyoshi NISHIKAWA closed the meeting with a speech which re-emphasized avoidance of a second Communist Party but said the new organization expected criticism not only from the JCP but also from foreign "fraternal" parties, which would be resisted. Nishikawa said the National Conference to be held in August would send appeals to foreign Communist parties.

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418. Khrushchev Loses Interest in a Test Ban

Background: During the late 1950's world public opinion, and especially opinion in such countries as India, Japan and Great Britain, became aroused on the subject of the dangers of nuclear testing -- not only the ultimate threat of atomic war but also the danger, which was often exaggerated, of nuclear fallout from the tests themselves. On 10 May 1955, Khrushchev, capitalizing on world sentiment, suggested an immediate cessation of nuclear tests. In June 1957 the Soviets further suggested that tests be banned independently of the progress of other disarmament measures, and indicated some willingness to accept inspection. The western negotiators had felt that a cessation of testing should at least be accompanied by a cut-off in the production of new fissionable materials, thus leading more surely to over-all nuclear disarmament. In 1958, at United States initiative, scientific experts from eight nations met and recommended a control system to police a test cessation agreement. On 31 October, 1958, US-UK-Soviet test ban treaty negotiations began, along with a voluntary suspension of testing. Shortly thereafter, the United States, in order to facilitate agreement on a test ban, abandoned its insistence on a link between test cessation and progress on other disarmament measures, such as a cut-off of fissionable materials production.

As might be expected, the negotiations have had their ups and downs. The Soviets fired off two nuclear explosions during the first week of November, 1958, though apparently only to complete their pre-suspension tests; no Soviet testing has been detected since. The US found that the experts, based on the research available to them, had underestimated some of the controls required, and we insisted on strengthening the control system; this led the Soviets to suspect that we were trying to break off negotiations, although they ultimately recognized in practice the validity of our position.

Until this year the principal problems have been:

(1) The Veto right. The Soviets wished to have a veto on all matters of substance including decisions to send inspection teams to sites of possible explosions. In the summer of 1960 they agreed that there might be a limited number of inspections, not subject to veto, in the USSR.

(2) On-site inspections. To break the veto deadlock on on-site inspection the Soviet Union agreed to allow only three annual inspections of the over 100 unidentified earth tremors which occur in the USSR each year. The US and UK proposed twenty.

(3) Make up of the Control Commission and Staff of the organization. The Soviets have sought as many representatives as the US and UK together on the governing control commission, and also to restrict the number of neutrals. Throughout, the Soviets have demanded at least one-third of all jobs in the control organization for themselves. Further, they have been unwilling to allow more than a few foreigners (US/UK and neutrals) to operate control posts in the USSR or conduct inspections in the USSR. Despite the difficulties, a large measure of agreement had been reached.

Outstanding differences, usually involving ratios and figures, should, as the Soviet Union stated in 1960, have been subject to negotiation. The Kennedy administration came to office prepared to bargain and make new concessions to

reach an agreement. On 18 April 1961, the US and UK presented at Geneva a draft treaty banning all detectable tests -- in the atmosphere, outer space, under the sea, and underground, of seismic magnitude 4.75 and above -- (such a treaty would have barred more than 95% of all past tests and all fallout), establishing an 11-man control commission (USSR - 4, US and UK combined - 4, neutrals - 3), providing for an impartial, neutral administrator and staff (which guaranteed the Soviet Union equality of representation), and reducing the number of control posts in the Soviet Union from 21 to 19, (full treaty would have 180 around the world) and for 12 to 20 veto-free inspections in the territory of each of the nuclear powers (USSR, UK, US) depending on the number of seismic disturbances. (There are normally up to 100 seismic events per year in the USSR). All these ratios and figures represent western concessions, and the western representatives have also agreed to extend the "on faith" moratorium on small underground tests, to give the USSR the veto on the total budget, and to open for complete inspection any US nuclear devices used for research on test detection.

But unlike the 1957 12-Party Declaration, the 1960 81-Party Moscow Declaration did not endorse a separate test ban. When Khrushchev saw Ambassador Thompson on 9 March 1961, Thompson got the impression that the Soviet leader had lost interest in a nuclear test ban agreement, except as part of general disarmament. This was borne out by what followed. On 21 March, Tsarapkin's opening statement at the resumption of the Geneva talks charged for the first time that French testing was blocking agreement, and also demanded the application of the troika principle to the test ban control administration. In the weeks and months that have followed, not one counter-concession has been offered to meet the new Anglo-American proposals. In an aide memoire of 4 June, the Soviets proposed that the nuclear test problem be settled as part of the "cardinal question" of "general and complete disarmament," thus reversing their June 1957 position of separating the test ban issue and proposing to throw out the window all that has been achieved. Khrushchev seems to be trying to provoke the US into breaking off the talks and assuming the onus of resuming tests. Some observers have suggested that the Soviets would then set off a super bomb as part of the terror side of their propaganda. Khrushchev has indicated he would like to develop a huge 100 megaton bomb and that he has many devices ready to be tested. And it may be that Chinese influence, or fear of Chinese criticism, has influenced Khrushchev's policy. President Kennedy is anxious to "go the last mile" and to try everything before giving up on what has seemed to be a practical first step 25X1C10b toward disarmament.

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419. Britain Joins the Common Market

Background: On 31 July, before what the New York Times called "a tense and sometimes rowdy" House of Commons, Prime Minister Macmillan announced the decision of Her Majesty's Government to seek membership in the European Common Market. His proposal was subsequently ratified by a vote of 313 to 5. This marks a complete reversal of a 300-year old British policy of non-commitment on the Continent.

The European Economic Community or Common Market was formed on 25 March 1957 with France, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Rome, binding themselves to create a tight economic unit in graded steps over a twelve year period, during which time all internal tariff barriers would be removed and a common tariff barrier erected against the outside world. Additional provisions relating to labor, employment rights, etc. have definite political and social overtones. This agreement marked a long step forward in the post-war move toward an integrated and politically unified Western Europe. The EEC countries have also recently begun the first moves toward concrete political cooperation among themselves. It is this political aspect of the EEC which has from the very beginning elicited the strong support the United States has given the Common Market idea.

Subsequently, a similar but looser economic union known as the European Free Trade Association was formed between Great Britain, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Sweden, providing for progressive mutual reduction of tariffs in step with Common Market action. In March 1961, Greece became associated with the Common Market and Finland with the European Free Trade Association.

In December 1960, on the initiative of the United States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was formed to replace the earlier Marshall Plan organization known as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The twenty-one members of this new organization included all the members of both the EEC and EFTA. The purpose of this organization is to foster closer coordination of economic policies and to promote an increased and coordinated aid effort in less developed areas.

All of these steps have demonstrated the increasing interdependence and cooperation among the members of the Atlantic community and the concentrated efforts in Europe to move toward a cohesive economic and political entity. Great Britain's decision marks the most important single move in recent years toward this end. Already Denmark, also a member of the EFTA, and Ireland have signified their intention to follow suit. It seems likely that other countries of Europe will move in the same direction. The United Kingdom's action holds forth the possibility of a single economic unit in Europe with a population and an economic capability considerably surpassing that of the USSR. This unit, while economic in form, would have political integration as its ultimate objective.

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ADDENDUM

Item #415 - See Item #399, 19 June 1961.

Item #416 - Attachment entitled "Gagarin News Conference Questions"

Item #417 - Attachment - Articles taken from Japanese newspapers

Item #420 - Attachment entitled "The Chinese and the United Nations - Background and Situation"

This item will be forwarded within the next two or three days.

420. The UN Debate on China

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11 August 1961

Gagarin News Conference Questions

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[Redacted]

1. Why doesn't the Soviet Union release basic scientific data as the United States regularly does? (Full data, such as complete statistics, on all U.S. space activities, are distributed to the press by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
2. Would you like to try out or inspect a Mercury capsule? Would you invite a United States astronaut to inspect the Vostok?
3. When will the Vostok be put on display so that its construction and instrumentation can be compared to the U.S. Mercury capsule?
4. Would the Soviets be willing to cooperate with the United States in the joint exploration of space for peaceful and scientific purposes?
5. If you were invited to witness a Mercury launching could you arrange for U.S. astronauts to witness a Soviet launching and recovery?
6. The Chkalov Air Club gave the official launching point of Vostok I as Baykonur. Inna Yavorskaya, Scientific secretary of the ICIC, stated in an article in SPACE AGE ASTRONOMY that the launch point was Kapustin Yar. These points are several hundred miles apart. How do you account for the discrepancy?
7. It has been noticed that some ships move into positions near the earth trace of the Vostoks. What part do they play in the operation?
8. Your flight was the first of its kind. We assume it provided information for subsequent flights--such as the one Titov has just made. What kind of information was this or what experiments were conducted which helped Titov? Was this made available to the United States for Shepard's flight?
9. Did Titov have more control of the craft than you did? What did you do and what did he do?
10. Did either of you initiate the landing and if so how are you able to come so close to a predetermined landing point?
11. How high were you when you ejected yourself from the spaceship? Did you have an oxygen mask on when you did this?
12. On 11 August, Titov disclosed that he chose to be ejected by parachute, as you were, rather than landing in the capsule. Would it not have been desirable to test a landing in the capsule?
13. Now that Titov has circled the earth 17 times, what are the possibilities of both of you making the next flight? When do you think that will be?
14. The pictures of Vostok I looked large enough for several people. How long do you think it will be before there are both men and women in the same flight? In such a case, would they all land together in one big capsule or would they each land with their own parachutes?
15. Major Titov was supposed to do calisthenics during his flight. How do you do this while in a weightless condition? (To Titov) Can you show us what you did?
16. Will there be manned flight to the moon during the 22nd CPSU Congress?
17. In your interview with Mr. Bartell in the Netherlands West Indies, you said that your next assignment was a flight to the moon. When do you plan to make this trip and will you make it alone? Will you use your old ship Vostok I for the flight?
18. What is the goal or goals of the Soviet space flight program?
19. Do space craft have any potential as military weapons? Considering the accuracy of ICBMs, do you think it is even sensible to talk about space weapons?

UNCLASSIFIED

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Asahi Shimbun (AM), 9 July 1961:

KASUGA Shojiro, Chairman of the Japan Communist Party's Central Control and Auditing Committee, met with reporters in a ryokan in Hongo Moto-machi at 5 o'clock p.m. on the 8th; he announced that he had that morning presented his notification of resignation from the Party to Party Headquarters and issued a declaration of his resignation. KASUGA's resignation, according to his statement, was directly occasioned by the mainstream faction's suppression of the minority view of the anti-mainstream faction, including KASUGA, concerning the draft Platform which has been a bone of contention between the two factions for several years, leading up to the 8th Party Congress, which will begin on the 25th of this month.

His resignation seems likely to spread to Central Committee members and others of the anti-mainstream faction who think as he does, and to make it impossible to avoid the occurrence of considerable disturbance within the Communist Party before the Congress.

Gist of Announcement of Resignation

1. I have resigned from the Japan Communist Party, in which I have been active for nearly forty years. In the future I shall continue to be active as a Communist and want to work for the substantive improvement of the Japan Communist Party.

2. The Platform which they are trying to have approved by the 8th Party Congress, to begin on the 25th, follows in the tradition of the 1951 Platform of the fire-bottle period, which we have opposed for years; it is basically mistaken. We think that a newly drawn up Platform must above all speak to the following points.

First, the superiority of the Socialist forces is becoming difficult to combat, the overall crisis of capitalism is worsening a step, and the possibility is increasing that the renovationist forces can solve the problems of peace and independence, democracy and Socialism, in a more advantageous form--it should apply the spirit of the Moscow Manifesto, which correctly described this character of the present era, properly to the situation in our country, and define correctly the character, tasks, and form of the Japanese revolution.

Second, it should correctly take up the fact that Japanese monopoly capital, which has accomplished the revival of imperialism, while strengthening its military alliance with American imperialism, is making new attacks on the Japanese people and again trying to march down the road to war, and show specifically to the working masses the road to Socialism in Japan.

Third, it should correctly evaluate the energy of the laboring class, shown here over several years in such great struggles as the Security Treaty and Mike struggles, and clearly present the problem of advancing this energy into a fight for Socialism.

However, the draft Platform which they are trying to have adopted is essentially no different from that published three years ago which was not adopted by the 7th Congress; it proceeds from the statement that "Japan is an oppressed race under the military control of America."

JCP Declaration

Japan Communist Party Headquarters suddenly on the evening of the 8th published a declaration from the Central Committee Presidium on the problem of KASUGA's resignation.

He resigned because he could not get the support of a majority of the Central Committee for his own view, and because the Party Congress would probably not be managed as he wished; this is an action which ignores the ABC's of Marx-Leninism and a shameful betrayal.

The Party has guaranteed unprecedentedly democratic discussion in the deliberations of the Central Committee. Accordingly, his statement that the reason for his resignation is that he could not publish his views within the Party is merely an excuse. The Party will formally decide upon the strictest punishment.

(p. 2) INFLUENCE WITHIN THE PARTY GREAT

(Analysis) It appears that KASUGA's resignation will cause great repercussions within the Party, which is awaiting the Congress, if only because he was considered a "central personality in the anti-mainstream faction which has opposed the mainstream faction headed by Secretary General MIYAMOTO Kenji over the draft Platform.

The reason for his resignation, as stated in his declaration, was opposition to mainstream views on the draft Platform to be presented to the Party Congress. According to the draft Platform, carried in a supplement to the 30 April Akahata, "What is basically controlling Japan is American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital, which is allied with it in a subordinate position." It asserts that "a new democratic revolution, a people's democratic revolution" against the control of these "two enemies" is "the present resolution in Japan."

However, KASUGA and the others counter: "The draft Platform, while talking about 'two enemies,' insists that military control by American Imperialism is the primary element of authority, and in effect, by putting the main force behind the anti-imperialism struggle, ignores the anti-monopoly struggle." It states that the draft Platform is in error.

According to what KASUGA and the others say, such a draft Platform was drawn up forcible by the mainstream faction, suppressing the views of the minority of anti-mainstream Central Committee members, and because such management of the Party by the mainstream is "dictatorship" he took the step of resigning. At any rate, KASUGA's resignation gives the occasion for the Platform problem, which has been a source of trouble within the Party for years, to be resolved as the Party faces the 8th Congress.

Japan Communist Party Headquarters says that, if in the future there are persons working with KASUGA, they will be resolutely expelled. However, security authorities believe, "We don't know whether they will take the step of resigning or not, but it appears that there is a strong anti-mainstream faction of five or six men among the cadres. Perhaps he was influenced by the Moscow Manifesto, and perhaps it is true that KASUGA resigned because the mainstream faction has recently taken a high-pressure attitude and out off criticism from the anti-mainstream and he could stand it no longer. In some areas, there may be mass defections stimulated by this, but the hegemony of the mainstream will probably not be greatly shaken by these. The Party has bragged that in the past one or two years Party influence has grown and its membership has doubled, but the uproar over this resignation may become a minus."

Statement by JSP Secretary General EDA:

The possibility that the members of the Communist Party mainstream might defect has been reported previously, and already critic SATO Noboru has resigned from the Party. The reason for this is that the Communist Party mainstream committed the mistake of treating Japan, in which monopoly capitalism is advanced and which is even increasingly taking on an imperialist coloration, like a backward colony. On top of that, it appears that the recent management by the Party cadres has increasingly tended to be extremely dictatorial, as in the era of TOKUDA Kyuichi.

The men of the anti-mainstream were going to stay in the Party and boycott the Congress, but does not Mr. KASUGA's resignation indicate that dissatisfaction within the Party against the thinking and management of the Party cadres has reached a peak?

JCP ORGAN: KUSAGA SHIFTS TO ENEMY CAMP

Tokyo AKAHATA in Japanese 11 July 1961 -- T

(Editorial: "The Theory and Practices of a Party Wrecker")

(Text) Shojiro Kasuga's treacherous action means that he has shifted from the Communist Party to the camp of enemy. His activities are all the more impermissible because he was in the important position of chairman of the control committee. There is no room for doubt that, at a time when the Eighth JCP Congress is drawing near, his actions are by no means accidental, but intentional. It is clear that he purposely selected the most suitable time and way to deal the heaviest blow to the party. No cunning apology and excuse can conceal the substance of his action.

The Central Committee Presidium immediately issued a statement to the effect that a decisive measure will be taken against his faithless activities, and appealed to the whole party to struggle against such acts of treachery. Chairman Nozaka of the Central Committee released a long statement exposing the substance of the ideology and acts of Shojiro Kasuga and emphasized that "the whole party should consolidate under the leadership of the Central Committee in order to crush such intrigues." All party members are indignant at the party wrecker. The communist organizations in various districts held emergency meetings and adopted resolutions to struggle against betrayers and for a major success in the coming Eighth JCP Congress.

We communists are not allowed to assume ambiguous attitudes toward a party wrecker, whatever theoretical and political views we may have. Such attitudes would be nothing but suicidal activities. The opinion that while Kasuga's action is wrong, his theory is also one of the party theories, is absolutely wrong. It is wrong to say that a party wrecker's theory and practices are not one and the same. His treacherous activities reveal the substance of his theory, which lacks the characteristics of party doctrine.

When he realized that his theory could not be accepted by party members, he began to abuse the party and chose an antiparty way. He knows that he cannot receive any honor in the party; however, outside the party, rightwing Socialist Democrats and all kinds of revisionists are willing to give him praise and encouragement. Therefore, he decided to leave the party in order to continue his subversive activities. This is the true nature of his ideology and theory.

In the first place, his withdrawal from the party has proved that his theory fundamentally corresponds with that of rightwing Social Democrats and revisionists. When there is no consistence between ideology and theory, nobody can obtain mental tranquility. In the second place, on the pretext of the platform problem he tried to reject the implementation of decisions adopted by the seventh party congress and guidance issued by the Central Committee. Therefore, he regarded and used his theory on the platform problem as an "influential weapon." Furthermore, he pretended to be obedient to the party decision both in the Central Committee and control committee. On the other hand, however, he tried to spread ideology and theory quite irreconcilable with the party decision, under the cover of the platform problem. His double-tongued attitude was completely exposed by his recent conduct. His theory was a weapon to achieve his objective and also a means to cover up his activities.

In the third place, he knew that his theory was a great obstacle to the ideological and political conformity of the party. By using his theory as a weapon, he has virtually organized factional activities in the party through an imperceptible method. This course of action proves that his ideology does not contain the basic communist ideology that party unification comes first and the party's interests should be put above the individual's interests.

His theory reflects his ideology. If there is no love for the party, no study of party tradition, no effort to establish the basic principle of centralized democracy

and to struggle for the unity and unification of the party, any ideology will be obliged to reveal its true character. Any theory based on an ideology which has no party characteristics and which ignores and is antagonistic to party characteristics has nothing to do with the party and is useless to the party, no matter what form it takes.

All party members must draw lessons from the deed of Shojiro Kasuga, and must make best use of these lessons for the solidarity and advancement of the party. The honorable name of a communist sits ill on the base qualities of his personality. As an individual, he is arrogant. Because of this arrogance, he always gave more consideration to himself or his own faction than to the party. Arrogance was the quality not of a communist but of a petit bourgeois. A career in party activities alone cannot reform a man into a genuine communist in the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, unless he tries hard to reform himself ideologically, theoretically, and practically, according to the party principle. Shojiro Kasuga proved this before all party members.

Of course, we do not mean that our comrades who oppose the draft party platform and regulation are all like Shojiro Kasuga. However, they must learn from what Kasuga has done against the party, must refute his antiparty activities, and must make efforts to reform themselves theoretically and ideologically through their resolute struggle against his antiparty activities. If they intend to stick to Kasuga's theory or to accuse the party Central Committee of an undemocratic attitude, all other party members must resolutely struggle against them.

Communists know how to turn a misfortune into a blessing. Make all possible efforts to frustrate antiparty activities, to win success for the coming party congress, and to consolidate the political, ideological and organizational unity of the party.

Mainichi (1/3 Summary) 15 July 1961

JCP's Future Gloomy

(Commentary) --the eighth Congress of the Japan Communist Party will be held in Tokyo for a week from July 25 for the first time in three years since the seventh Party Congress in July 1958. The most important subject of discussion at the coming Congress is the Party platform. However, the situation inside and outside the JCP with its Congress close at hand appears to far from being calm. Two incidents substantiating this fact have occurred of late. One of them is the secession from the Party on July 8 by Shojiro KASUGA who had held the important post of Chairman of the Central Control and Audit Committee and the other is the Government's decision reached at the July 14 Cabinet meeting to refuse entry into this country of delegates from foreign Communist parties to attend the coming JCP Congress.

The KASUGA secession incident was a great shock to the JCP and is receiving great attention from police authorities and various other quarters. In this connection, the JCP Central Committee Presidium immediately issued a statement, regarding KASUGA's secession as "a traitorous anti-Party act," and clarified the attitude of taking severe actions against him. On the other hand, KASUGA's statement on his secession from the Party called for qualitative reform of the Party, emphasizing the following two points: 1) The draft platform to be adopted is fundamentally mistaken and 2) Party leaders are sticking to the draft instead of correcting the mistake and, in order to suppress all criticism and opposition, are destroying intra-Party democracy and are becoming dictatorial.

In this connection, police authorities believe that the intra-JCP conflict over the draft platform is becoming considerably intense and that the recent secession incident was a tangible expression of this conflict. Their investigation reveals that the central faction of the JCP is carrying out activities to shut delegates from the anti-central faction out of the coming Congress and that all anti-central speeches at the Congress will be blocked through imposition of restrictions on speeches there. Furthermore, they observe that despite the intense intra-Party conflict, the draft platform will be approved at the Congress without any difficulty.

However, the step taken on July 14 by the Government can be said to have forestalled the JCP which was trying to enliven the Congress by receiving delegates from foreign communist parties. Among these foreign delegates, MUKHIZHINOV (member of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee Presidium and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet) is said to be the right-hand man of Premier KHRUSHCHEV and ranks seventh in the hierarchy of the Soviet Communist Party. PENG Cheng (Politburo member of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and Mayor of Peiping) is also the ninth boss of the Chinese Communist Party and is regarded as a future hope. Some are of the opinion that the JCP's central faction was trying to strengthen the Party's unity, taking advantage of the visit to Japan by such "bigwigs". The Government on the hand seems to have taken the recent step from the judgment that the situation has become tense due to the series of moves leading up to the conclusion of the military alliance with North Korea, in addition to the Security Treaty controversy of last year, and the stepped-up activities of international communism since the Moscow Declaration of 81 communist parties of the world.

Thus the JCP is being exposed to attacks from outside, but even within it the problem of taking "severe action" against KASUGA and other members of the anti-central faction is still pending. Outwardly, the coming Party Congress will avoid confusion, but this will cause the intra-Party friction to become rooted more deeply inwards. Such being the case the future of the JCP is expected to be considerably difficult.

Tokyo Shimbun (1/3 Summary) July 17, 1961

JCP Internal Conflict Intensifies

The Japan Communist Party plans to open its 8th Congress in Tokyo on July 25 and to adopt formally its long-pending platform. But an intra-Party conflict over the draft platform has recently come to the fore. The Presidium of the JCP's Central Committee on July 16 issued a statement calling for severe actions against anti-Party elements at this time when several Central Committee members of the anti-mainstream faction are showing signs of seceding from the Party following on the heels of Chairman Shojiro KASUGA of the Central Control and Audit Committee, who has already left the Party. The JCP platform controversy has persistently continued since the seventh Party Congress of three years ago. Heated discussion on the matter at the eighth Party Congress had been expected, but the eruption of trouble, such as secession from the Party, in advance of the Congress shows how intense the conflict between the main and anti-mainstream factions is. Furthermore, in connection with the series of their moves leading up to the conclusion of their military alliances with North Korea, it is certain that the USSR and Communist China are attaching considerable importance to the existence of the JCP. Therefore, the current intra-Party dissension will be subjected to greater international influence; in the future, as a result, the JCP's course will become more complicated and will become an existence which should be watched closely in connection with mass movements.

The new draft platform, which will be submitted to the eighth Party Congress was finally approved at the 16th Central Committee general meeting in March. At this meeting, Kozo KAMEYAMA, Rokuzaemon YAMADA, and six other members of the Central Committee and candidates for the Central Committee opposed the draft, but the main stream faction forced it through the meeting by a majority vote. This was an unprecedented event since the formation of the Party, which has always upheld the principle of unanimous decision. Such a high-handed attitude of the main stream faction is attributed mainly to the faction's outnumbering the anti-mainstream faction and to the considerably strong support from the USSR and Communist China.

With this as a background, KASUGA bolted the Party and some Central Committee members of the anti-mainstream faction are also showing moves to quit the Party. The main stream faction on July 16 issued a statement through the Presidium of the Central Committee and took the strong attitude of branding these anti-mainstream faction members as "instigators trying to destroy the Party", and pledging "to take severe action against anti-Party elements." It is considered certain, therefore, that KASUGA and other anti-mainstream faction members will be expelled from the Party. This will provide momentum for the mainstream faction to try to take the leadership in the Party by whatever means.

Be that as it may, what is causing the anti-mainstream faction to take the last resort of secession from the Party? To be sure, the direct reason seems to be the theoretical and emotional conflict over the platform problem. At the national activists conference held after the 16th Central Committee general meeting, the main stream faction reportedly virtually placed under house arrest the Central Committee members of the anti-mainstream faction, who opposed the draft platform at that general meeting, and cut off their contact with subordinate organs and the masses. Aside from this intra-Party situation, what is interesting is that it is seriously rumored in some quarters that there is some relation between the anti-mainstream faction and Moscow. What is regarded as the ground behind this rumor is the view that the JCP's draft platform or the JCP main stream faction's opinion is rather nearer the line of Communist China while the anti-mainstream faction's stand has something in common with the peaceful co-existence policy of Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV.

At any rate, it is almost certain that the platform will be adopted by a majority vote at the forthcoming JCP Congress. But this does not mean putting an

end to the intra-Party conflict. Rather, it will start off further internal trouble. What is to be feared in this connection is that there is danger of the main stream faction strengthening its attitude favoring centralization of power in order to subjugate the anti-main stream faction and its intensifying its radical anti-American struggle as ordered by Moscow. This view is based on the observation that in view of the possible aggravation of international tension the only way for the main stream faction to secure the leadership in the Party and continue to obtain international support is through radical actions.

ATTACHMENT to Item #420

UNCLASSIFIED

14 August

THE CHINESE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

BACKGROUND AND SITUATION

The Republic of China was awarded charter membership in the United Nations (UN) Organization in 1945 as a signatory to the UN Charter when that document was signed in San Francisco by representatives of 50 nations. Along with membership in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Republic of China, as represented by its accredited Government of the Republic of China (GRC), was awarded a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) as one of the Big Five allied military powers of World War II: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (US).*

On 1 October 1949, following the expulsion of GRC forces from their position of power over the bulk of mainland China, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and declared it to be the "sole legal government representing all the people of the People's Republic of China."† The GRC subsequently removed its seat of government to the island of Taiwan, which it claimed was an integral part of China -- a claim concurred in by the PRC.

In November 1949 and January 1950 the PRC made representations to the UNGA and UNSC, respectively, as their first approaches to affiliation with the UN. These approaches were indirect, however, for in them the PRC merely denounced the GRC UN delegation as unqualified to further represent China in the UN. In August 1950 the PRC requested that arrangements be made for the seating of a PRC delegation in the stead of the GRC delegation at the next regular UNGA session. However, due to UN inaction, nothing came of any of these efforts. In later years the PRC was invited to send representatives to special UN deliberations, but the PRC appears not to have made any further direct efforts to obtain inclusion in the world organization.

The major efforts within the UN itself toward PRC inclusion have been made by the Soviet Union. On 13 January 1950 the Soviet delegate to the Security Council proposed the unseating of the GRC delegation at a Council meeting. The proposal was rejected, whereupon the Soviet delegation walked out of the Council to remain out until the following 1 August. On that date the Soviets returned since it was the turn of their representative to preside over the Council. As one of his first acts, the Soviet UNSC president ruled that the GRC was not qualified to occupy a Council seat, but his ruling was negated by a majority vote of the Council.

From that time until 1954 the issue of PRC inclusion in the UN took the form, primarily, of credentials tests offered at the outset of each UNGA regular session by the Soviet Union.* On each occasion the Assembly's Credentials Committee refrained from a studied examination of the problem.

* One of the members of the GRC delegation signing the UN Charter was the representative of the Chinese Communist Party, Tung Pi-wu. He was accredited to the delegation by virtue of the GRC being empowered by his party to represent it in the UN action, a situation which has since given rise to a question as to whether or not the GRC may not after all retain such power insofar as action concerning China's affairs in the UN may be concerned. Tung is now a vice chairman of the PRC government.

† See FBIS Daily Report, Far East, No. 191-1949, 4 October 1949, p. PPP 18. The proclamation contained no definitive statement that the PRC was to be considered the successor government of the Republic of China nor did it contain any PRC claim to be henceforth considered the bona fide representative government of the Republic of China in the United Nations.

* In point of fact, the credentials aspect of the question has been raised every year since 1949, but, except for events transpiring at the first and second UNGA emergency special sessions in the fall of 1956, this aspect has not been the focal point of the question since 1953.

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In 1954 and 1955 the Soviets introduced resolutions to seat the PRC and India sought to include the matter as an issue for debate on the UNGA agenda from 1956 to 1959 -- unsuccessfully. In 1960 the Soviet Union again tried to raise the question, this time, per the Indian example, as an agenda item, but again without success.

This lack of success can be traced directly to the efforts of the US UN delegation. From 1951 through 1960 US resolutions calling for the postponement of consideration of the China UN representation question by the UNGA were approved by the Assembly.* It is these resolutions that have come to be known, collectively, as the moratorium. How and where the moratorium tactic has been employed by the US during the past ten years is discussed in the following paragraphs.

The question of Chinese UN representation was raised as a point of order during the opening meeting of the UNGA regular session in the fall of 1950 before the appointment of the Credentials Committee for that session, normally the Assembly's first order of business. It was resolved at that time by the establishment of a special committee charged with considering the question. In accordance with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, the GRC delegation was seated with full privileges pending the results of the committee's study. Eventually, the special committee submitted a report that contained no recommendations. The Assembly took note of the report but did not further act, and the GRC delegation continued its functions.

During the next three years UNGA action on the Chinese UN representation question originated in the Assembly's Credentials Committee. As the outset of each regular UNGA session in this period the Soviets sought to have the credentials of the GRC declared invalid in favor of seating a delegation from the PRC. On each occasion the committee voted its approval of US-sponsored resolutions to proscribe further discussion of the question during the remainder of the session and transmitted this view to the UNGA itself as part of its credentials report. And on each occasion the Assembly approved the committee's report and honored the moratorium resolution. In 1952, however, the US resolution approved by the committee and, thereafter, by the Assembly in committee report form contained an additional proviso: that the GRC's credentials were valid in terms of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.* This proviso represents a vital discussion point in any argument of the merit of the GRC to continued UN membership.

(In 1956 the Credentials Committee bulwarked its 1952 action by again, through the medium of a US resolution, expressly approving the credentials of the GRC delegation in the wake of Soviet protesting action:

On 31 October and 1 November 1956, Albania, Bulgaria, and Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR protested to the President of the First Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly and to the Secretary-General at the place of the People's Republic of China being wrongfully taken

* Except for two occasions (1952 and 1956) discussed below, these resolutions did not infer that the question was invalid at least as it pertained to continued GRC membership; rather, they disclaimed the need for discussion of it.

* "...on the motion of the United States, the Committee adopted a resolution: (1) recommending that the General Assembly should postpone for the duration of its seventh session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China, and to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China, and (2) finding that the credentials of the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China conformed with the provisions of the General Assembly's rules....

"...The General Assembly adopted the report of the Credentials Committee, together with the recommendations contained therein."-- "Everyman's United Nations, 1954-55," 5th edition, United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1956, p. 100.

at the session by the "Kuomintang" delegation, whose credentials they did not recognize as valid.

On 8 November 1956, in the Credentials Committee of the First and Second Emergency Special Sessions of the General Assembly, the USSR representative challenged the credentials of the representative of the Government of the Republic of China. Statements in support of seating the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China were also made by the representatives of India and Afghanistan. The representatives of France, the United States and the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, maintained that the credentials of the representatives of China were in order. The Committee decided by a vote of 6 to 3 to accept the credentials of the representative of China. This decision was endorsed at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 9 November 1956, when the report of the Credentials Committee was approved by a vote of 68 to 0, with 1 abstention.)*

By 1954 the China representation question had become so controversial that the Credentials Committee began a purposeful delay in its meeting schedule in contravention of its mandate to report to the General Assembly without delay. Whereas in previous years the committee submitted its report within the first few days of each regular session, it now took to reporting some weeks after the session opened. This maneuver enabled the committee to take advantage of intervening UNGA-approved US-sponsored moratorium resolutions proscribing action on the question from year to year.

With advent of this situation in 1954 the Soviet Union undertook a new method of attempting to effectuate the seating of the PRC in the UN. At the opening plenary meeting of the ninth regular UNGA session, the Soviets introduced a draft resolution calling for the seating of the PRC in the UN. The US delegation thereupon introduced a counter-resolution calling for the Assembly to disdain discussion of the Chinese UN representation question at that session and requesting that the US resolution be voted on before that of the Soviet Union. The Assembly acceded to the US request and applied a moratorium on discussion of the China question by a vote of 43 to 11 with 6 abstentions.

The Soviets tried the same maneuver in 1955, an occasion which saw India speaking in behalf of the cause of the PRC for the first time. Nevertheless, the UNGA in a 43-12-6 vote again approved a US-sponsored moratorium resolution.*

A third maneuver designed to subvert the successful US moratorium tactic was attempted for the first time in 1956. On 11 November of that year, in the wake of the unsuccessful Soviet efforts to obtain favorable action in the Credentials Committee (described parenthetically on pages four and five) India petitioned for inclusion of the question as an Additional Item to the agenda of the eleventh regular session of the UNGA. The Indian petition was considered perforce by the Assembly's General Committee, meeting to iron out the final agenda, and it was on this occasion that the US introduced its moratorium resolution, calling this time for rejection of the Indian request in the first place and for a moratorium against any further discussion of the question at the eleventh regular session in the second place.

* While this vote indicates the concurrence of the Communist bloc, the Soviet Union and the Byelorussian SSR qualified their aye votes by withholding approval of the committee's action endorsing the GRC credentials. -- "Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956," Columbia University Press in co-operation with the United Nations, New York, 1957, p. 136.

* The Soviet Union did not limit itself to the Credentials Committee or the UNGA itself in its efforts to obtain approval of the PRC by the UN. In 1955 these other UN organs heard the question raised: the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Children's Fund executive board, the International Law Commission, the Transport and Communications Commission, the Social Commission, the Commission on the Status of Women, the Population Commission, the Commission on International Commodity Trade, the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Security Council.

The General Committee approved the moratorium resolution and forwarded its recommendation to the General Assembly. There India tried to subvert the moratorium by calling for an amendment to the General Committee report negating its recommendation of the moratorium. This maneuver was voted down by the UNGA in its approval of the committee report.

Despite these actions, the China UN representation question was raised again when the Credentials Committee held its late-session meeting. However, nothing came of this last-ditch effort.

The twelfth regular UNGA session (1957) saw a repeat of these same tactics. India petitioned for inclusion of the question on the Assembly agenda. The General Committee rejected the Indian bid. India tried to overturn the committee's action with appropriate amendments to the committee's report when it was submitted to the Assembly for approval. The Assembly rejected this Indian effort in approving the committee report containing the US-sponsored moratorium resolution. The question was raised again in the Credentials Committee, meeting in December 1957, and again without success.

The same pattern was followed again in 1958 and 1959 with only slight variations. In 1958 India's petition for inclusion of the question in the Assembly agenda was submitted in mid-July thus meriting consideration as a Supplementary Item to the agenda in terms of the Assembly's rules of procedure rather than an Additional Item. Nevertheless, it still came before the General Committee for judgement and was there again rejected. In 1959 India again submitted her petition in mid-July with the same result.

In addition to action taken in the thirteenth regular session in 1958, the question was also subjected to action in the third emergency special session meeting in August of that year. This latter action was confined to the Credentials Committee and General Assembly only, however. On 19 August 1958 the US introduced its moratorium resolution in answer to a Soviet resolution calling for the committee to declare the GRC credentials invalid. The committee approved the US resolution and this action was in turn approved by the Assembly two days later.

The only variation of the 1956 regular session pattern in 1959 was in the presentation of amendments to the General Committee report designed to overturn the committee's approval of the US moratorium by Nepal rather than India. The Nepalese effort fared no better. In the Credentials Committee meeting of 9 December 1959 the committee chairman ruled the Soviet effort to have the GRC credentials invalidated out of order.

India abandoned her 1956-1959 role in the China UN representation question last year in the wake of the Sino-Indian border dispute. India's place was taken by the Soviet Union which petitioned for inclusion of the question on the Assembly agenda for the fifteenth regular session. Again the General Committee rejected the bid and again the UNGA upheld the committee-approved US moratorium resolution, though by a narrowing vote of only 42-34-22.

In terms of the UN Charter and rules of procedure the PRC can gain entry to the UN by only one of two methods: 1) UN approval of a PRC application for membership as a new member nation, and 2) replacement of the GRC UN delegation by an accredited delegation from the PRC. The Peking regime has declared time and again it won't seek UN admission as a new member nation. Moreover, any PRC application for new nation membership would undoubtedly be vetoed by the Security Council. Thus, barring a specially devised method by the UNGA facilitating PRC UN membership, the only effective avenue of approach open to those favoring PRC inclusion in the UN is that represented by a credentials decision declaring the GRC credentials invalid and the GRC no longer worthy of representing the Republic of China (as China is referred to in the UN Charter) in the United Nations.

Yet, even this avenue of approach can be argued to be already closed. From all appearances the China representation question can be resolved within the framework provided by the 8 October 1947 report of the UNGA's Sixth Committee. This report resulted from a committee study of the Pakistani UN membership question raised in September 1947 by Argentina on the occasion of UN approval of membership for the new state of Pakistan. Importantly, the committee's conclusions were expressly designed for future use only -- not for application to the Pakistan membership question! These conclusions are twofold:

1. That, as a general rule, it is in conformity with legal principles to presume that a State which is a Member of the organization of the United Nations does not cease to be a Member simply because its constitution or its frontier have been subjected to changes, and that the extinction of the State as a legal personality recognized in the international order must be shown before its rights and obligations can be considered thereby to have ceased to exist.

2. That when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and the populations which it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State Member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter claim the status of a Member of the United Nations unless it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.*

The GRC in and of itself thus fully qualifies for continued membership in the UN on the basis of the first of the Sixth Committee's two conclusions -- the effectiveness and political veracity of its claim to be the continuing legal government of China notwithstanding. And the PRC can readily be defined as a new state in terms of the committee's second conclusion, any claim to the contrary it may make notwithstanding. Further, under the terms of these conclusions the PRC can be called upon to qualify itself for UN admission as a new member nation if it desires membership at all.

This report of the Sixth Committee is seen to be the basis of a useful rebuttal to the expected Communist effort to gain inclusion for the PRC in the UN via a credentials decision by the General Assembly. Furthermore, this report coupled with the specific validations of the GRC's credentials by the Credentials Committee, as endorsed by the UNGA itself in 1952 and 1956 (see pages four and five), represents a seemingly cogent argument on procedural grounds in the General Assembly for the verity of continued GRC UN membership. Neither the GRC credentials nor the rules of procedure against which they were measured have changed in essence, incidentally, during the intervening years.

* "Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948," p. 40.